1.
In that part of the Appendix dealing with personal identity, Hume begins by confessing that a strict review of his earlier opinions on that subject leaves him "in such a labyrinth that ... I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent."2 He then offers to ' 'propose the arguments on both sides." Unfortu nately, only the arguments on one side are at all fully set forth. And that side is the one already represented in the Treatise. He argues that we have no idea of self (or mind or thinking being -these terms are used interchangeably), because we have no impression of it, and every idea is derived from some impression. He furthermore argues that all perceptions (a term covering both ideas and impressions) are distinct, and therefore may exist separately. In "reflexion," moreover, we never perceive anything but per ceptions. And the conclusion is that the mind is composed 
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of these distinct existences -of perceptions. Noting, finally, that philosophers are beginning to accept the principle that we have no idea of external substance apart from the ideas of particular qualities, Hume urges that "this must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions ,'trĨ t is of some importance to note how satisfied Hume is with the argument to this point. "So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence," he says immediately after this review of the Treatise argument. It is not this loosening of perceptions which now gives him pause, but the account he had given in Actually, the disagreement over 12 has deeper roots, and we must pay close attention to the exact wording of the entire passage -especially 10 and 13 -if we are to do better. It is also important to keep in mind that the puzzle is not over what is wrong with Hume's account of personal identity -that is not so hard to see -but what Hume thought was wrong with it. What was it that led him to plead the privilege of a sceptic and confess the difficulty too hard for him?
In this connection we must also remember that the Treatise view did not pretend to explain the actual identity of the self. According to the Treatise there is no such identity. What Hume had tried to do in the Treatise was to explain our belief that the self is one. This belief, of course, is a mistake, but an inevitable mistake. The out lines of his explanation are familiar. A succession of similar perceptions is confused with strict identity, especially if the perceptions change only a little, or very slowly, or if their function remains constant, or if they are all causally related to a common end. And numerical and qualitative identity are often not distinguished, so that we call numerically the same what is only qualitatively similar. We feel our thoughts led smoothly from one per ception to another, imagine that there is some one thing which accounts for the unity we feel, and construct the fiction of the self.
It is along such lines that Hume thought in the Treatise to account for the conviction -illusory though he believed it to be -of our personal identity. It is this account of the "principle of connexion" which "makes us attribute" to 
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E-3 perceptions a "real simplicity and identity" that he now finds "very defective." (2) We must not fall into the confusion of thinking that in the Appendix Hume is expres sing doubt that his principles explain the unity of the self; he had never thought they did; they were not framed to do so; and there is no evidence that this was the source of his despair. He is perplexed because he now sees that these Treatise principles do not satisfactorily account for the belief each of us obviously has -that he is one and the same person Cor self) through all the changes he under goes. The "principles of connexion," in short, do not do the job they were designed to do.
3. Hume is satisfied that the mind is composed of percep tions, and that perceptions are distinct existences. They can form a whole, therefore, only by being connected to gether (see 3). But it is one of the cardinal principles of Hume's philosophy that human understanding or reason can never discover real connections among distinct existences (4). This is the basis of his critique of the received doctrines of causality and substance, and is repeated in 12 as one of those principles he cannot renounce. Belief in such connections is produced when we reflect on past per ceptions and feel our thoughts led (by habit or custom, Hume says elsewhere) from the idea of one perception to that of another (see 5 and 6). This is not surprising, Hume remarks, for most philoso phers think that personal identity arises from reflective thought ( It is reflective thought alone, remember, which finds personal identity (6). Belief in the identity of the self arises from "consciousness," and consciousness is a "reflected thought or perception" (8). Let us call these reflective thoughts second-level perceptions. (It is of the utmost importance for the proper interpretation of the Appendix to note that these "reflected thoughts" are also called "perceptions." Hume is consistent in using "perception" in this broad way throughout the treatment of personal identity, and elsewhere as well.) Thought, reflecting on the m 's, is led by the resem blances, continuities, and causal relations between them, to the idea that they form a natural whole, a self. But may this not be just speculation? Is there any textual evidence to back up this interpretation? The crucial sentence is 10, which is ambiguous and can be read in two ways. Hume here confesses his inability to explain the principles which "unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness." On one reading, the usual one to date, the perceptions spoken of are taken to be first-level perceptions, and are to be distinguished from the "thought or consciousness" in which they are united. They are the m 's, the a's, and the s 's, while the thoughts are the M 's, the A 's, and the S's. On this reading Hume is confessing that the principles he had made use of in the Treatise (resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect, plus the "easy passage" of the mind) no longer satisfy him.
An ideal interpretation of this text would have to con
If this were the case, however, we should expect Hume to retract more than just his views on personal identity. For the identity which can be ascribed to first-level percep tions is analogous to that we attribute to plants and animals.
Thus we should find Hume expressing a much wider dissatisfaction with his former views than he does.
Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, p. 253.
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We must look, then, to the second reading of 10. Remem bering that Hume uses "perception" to cover reflective ideas and thoughts as well as impressions, we can see that the perceptions referred to here are those in our thought or consciousness. They are not the objects of thought but its elements. That is, they are reflective perceptions (perceptions of second and higher levels), the thoughts themselves. Using the terminology previously introduced, 10 may be paraphrased as follows: "But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our higher-level perceptions (i.e., the elements of our thought or consciousness)."
A little reflection on the part of the reader should convince her that this is a perfectly possible reading of 10. There is also available a plausible explanation of why it has generally been read in the first way. Philosophical terminology since Kant has tended to oppose perceptions and thoughts, so that it seems very odd to speak of ideas and thoughts as perceptions. Thus it is "natural" to us to suppose the perceptions referred to in 10 must be the objects of thought. It is especially easy to do so because Hume himself seems to have been thinking of personal identity in terms of relations between first-level percep tions in the Treatise. When he saw, however, that the problem repeated itself on the level of thoughts he felt baffled. He was in the grip, I think, of a Wittgensteinian sort of puzzlement: "'But this isn't how it is!' -we say. 'Yet this is how it has to be!'"9 Sentence 10 points, then, to an infinite regress. But is the regress a vicious one? I believe it is, given the content of the belief Hume is trying to explain. Consider an M which is a perception of the requisite resemblances between a series of m's. 1. There is "something simple and individual" in which our perceptions inhere (the mind, soul, or self). 2. There is a real connection between perceptions which can be perceived (in which case the connected elements altogether constitute the mind). 3. There is just a fiction, imaginatively constructed on the basis of similarities between completely distinct perceptions.
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Hume had tried 3 in the Treatise, and he now sees that it doesn't work. And the reason it doesn't work is that it leads to the regress.
( We may wish to say that Hume was inappropriately search ing for criteria of identity where none are to be found. Or that questions of personal identity must include reference to a body, empirically identified. But Hume did not see either of these possibilities. In the grip of a sensation alist epistemology and theory of meaning, Hume pursued his researches into the realm of the self. It was a great critical accomplishment to see that such a project must come to grief. Though we might wish that he had expressed his perplexity as clearly as I believe he saw it.
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